

A REPORTER AT LARGE

THE MORATORIUM AND THE NEW MOBE

ONE morning shortly after the Vietnam Moratorium demonstrations around the country last October, three of the young coordinators of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee—Sam Brown, David Mixner, and David Hawk—sat down at a table behind a bank of microphones in a room at the Ambassador Hotel in Washington and held a press conference for more than a hundred newsmen. The three young men belonged to the generation of activists who had played a role in forcing a President into retirement, thereby acquiring a strong sense of their own political power, and the success of their first Moratorium had exceeded all their hopes; they had an air of shy earnestness that morning, the self-conscious candor of men trying to handle sudden fame with modesty. To the right of the microphones was David Mixner, twenty-four, a hefty young man with a ready smile, who had organized caucuses in non-primary states for Eugene McCarthy's Presidential campaign in 1968; he had been on crutches for three months after the police threw him through a hotel window during the Chicago Convention, and he later suffered a heart attack, partly from the sheer exhaustion of his campaign work. At the left was David Hawk, twenty-six, a former divinity student with a pale, handsomely chiselled face, who had worked for McCarthy in New Hampshire and was facing trial in the near future for resisting the draft. In the center was Sam Brown, twenty-six, a slight, elegant man with a cinnamon-colored mustache, also a former divinity student, who had been chief student coordinator for the McCarthy campaign. Although Brown, Mixner, and Hawk were unusually poised for their age, they fidgeted

uneasily before the microphones, looking uncomfortable over what they had to say. For one of the reasons they had called the conference was to announce the Moratorium Committee's endorsement of a vastly more controversial group, called the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam—a coalition of some sixty organizations, ranging in ideology from the Episcopal Peace Fellowship to the Socialist Workers' Party, which was proposing to bring several hundred thousand Americans to Washington in November for another large protest against the Vietnam war. The Moratorium was backed by many cautious liberals who regarded mass demonstrations as both too radical and rather obsolete and preferred quiet grass-roots organization. It may be for this reason that each of the three young leaders looked somewhat sheepish that day, as if he was about to an-

nounce his marriage to an older woman of doubtful reputation.

The television cameras started whirring, and Brown, the official spokesman for the group, rose and began to read in a soft voice from a prepared text: "The second series of activities of the Vietnam Moratorium is scheduled for November 13th and 14th. On these dates, local committees around the country will be continuing the efforts which got off to such a tremendous start on October 15th." Brown enumerated the various local activities planned for the November Moratorium: educational programs, such as canvassing and meetings with congressional leaders; community referendums and resolutions on immediate-withdrawal plans; symbolic activities, such as reading the names of the war dead, the wearing of black armbands, and church memorial services. But there was a distinct note of uneasiness in his

voice as he began to read the last part of his text: "On November 13th and 14th, the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam is sponsoring a March Against Death—a Vietnam memorial. Many supporters of the Moratorium will be participating in this solemn event. . . . On November 15th, the New Mobilization is sponsoring a peaceful and legal mass march and Rally in Washington, D.C. The four coordinators of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, as well as many Moratorium supporters from around the country, plan to march. We will provide support for local Moratorium groups who will be coming to Washington and encourage others to join the March in Washington."

Brown sat down with an air of relief, and fielded the newsmen's questions in careful sociologese.



"I've done it! I've written the great American bumper sticker!"

"Our November activities will be of higher intensity and lower visibility. . . . The general term of response is that last month we had a significant new segment of the American community joining us. . . . We view our actions as complementary, not contradictory, to those of the New Mobilization."

The Moratorium's press conference ended a little before eleven o'clock, at which time a press conference called by the co-chairmen of the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam—known as the New Mobe—was scheduled to take place in the same room. The next group of individuals who settled before the microphones were considerably older than the Moratorium leaders, and they had the weighty self-assurance of men who were veterans rather than newcomers in the business of demanding peace. At the table this time were Stewart Meacham, an imposing silver-haired former Presbyterian minister and union official, who was at present the Peace Education Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee; the Reverend Richard Fernandez, a minister of the United Church of Christ, who was director of Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam; Sidney Peck, swarthy and intense, a professor of sociology at Case Western Reserve University, in Cleveland; Cora Weiss, a handsome Riverdale housewife, who was a leader of Women Strike for Peace; Ron Young, a pacifist and draft-resister; and Sidney Lens, pacifist, trade-unionist, and prolific historian of the labor movement. Two other New Mobe co-chairmen were unable to attend the meeting—Douglas Dowd, a professor of economics at Cornell University, and David Dellinger, a pacifist who began his career by studying for the ministry at Union Theological Seminary, and who was standing trial in Chicago on a charge of conspiring to incite riot at the Democratic Convention of 1968.

The New Mobe leaders had a much more pronounced taste for political analysis than the preceding group, and they expounded it as from a pulpit or a union-meeting platform. "The present war strategy includes three distinct elements," Sidney Lens declaimed in a powerful voice. "One: U.S. military and economic aid to the Thieu-Ky government. Two: U.S. combat forces, which do the actual fighting. Three: U.S. bombing and logistical support. The Nixon strategy proposes to eliminate only the ground combat troops supplied by the United States and continue the other two elements of the



"Movies? You're not old enough to go to the movies."

strategy unchanged. Mr. Nixon has no intention of ending the war but merely of changing assignments between the United States and its puppet allies. . . . Unfortunately for Mr. Nixon, as for Mr. Johnson, the American people want to get out of Vietnam. They are sick of the deaths, sick of the inflation, sick of the cut in living standards, sick of the tension, sick of confronting the danger of an enlarged war. To appease the American people, therefore, Nixon is seeking to reduce casualties by disengaging from ground combat. But he has no intention to disengage from the war itself unless and until he wins the political objectives the American ruling circles have demanded from the beginning—military bases, spheres of influence and trade, the continued presence of puppet regimes—in short, an iron ring around China." Lens ended with a demand for a cease-fire accompanied by withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam "as soon as boats and planes can take them out."

A reporter asked whether the speech that President Nixon had scheduled for November 3rd might not negate the purpose of the November demonstrations.

"Just as the deception of Nixon's policy as announced on his election platform created the Moratorium," Lens replied, "so the deception we anticipate on November 3rd will be an incentive for larger groups in Washington on November 15th."

The reporters pressed the New Mobe leaders much harder than they had the coordinators of the Moratorium.

"If this war could be won by either side, which side would you be on?" one newsman asked.

"We're on the side of the American people winning honor by getting out!" Lens roared.

"Is there not a member of the Communist Party on your steering committee?" asked another newsman.

Stewart Meacham answered, "We are a broad coalition of individuals connected with some sixty organizations, and one of the members of our coalition is Mr. Arnold Johnson, peace secretary of the American Communist Party. The only two principles at work in the composition of Mobe are: one, the principle of non-violence; two, the principle of non-exclusion, which we believe essential to a rich, free society."

But the principle of non-exclusion was far from settled, and was to come up repeatedly as the two groups cooperated in preparing for the November demonstrations.

THE Moratorium, which represents a tradition of political centrism, is made up largely of Americans who are against the war but are still determined to work within the two-party system. The New Mobe is in the tradition of American radicalism which—whether practiced by Thoreau, by William Lloyd Garrison, or by Eugene

Debs—has been forced by the very nature of our two-party system to operate outside of the political mainstream. Considering the long-standing distrust between the two traditions, the alliance worked out between the left and the center of the peace movement for the November demonstrations was a remarkable achievement.

The origins of the Moratorium are recent and relatively uncomplicated. In the spring of 1969, Jerome Grossman, a fifty-two-year-old Massachusetts envelope manufacturer who had been active in the McCarthy campaign, suggested to Sam Brown that a series of nationwide strikes, increasing by one day a month, should be organized in protest against the war. The word "strike" seemed too radical to Brown, but he adapted Grossman's ideas to a program under which peaceful pauses in "business as usual" would be coordinated across the nation as long as the Vietnam war continued. Brown pulled into the program some friends who had been active in the Presidential campaigns of both McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, Grossman helped in raising seed money for the project, and the Moratorium began operations in mid-summer, in offices on the eighth floor of the building at 1029 Vermont Avenue, four blocks from the White House. Right from the start, the Moratorium was marked by the same romantic improvisation and youthful enthusiasm that had characterized the McCarthy campaign. Its October 15th success was as unexpected and exhilarating as that of the New Hampshire primary, and its later deflation proved again that charm and idealism are not enough to keep a nationwide political movement successful.

The origins of the New Mobe, which has always stayed aloof from electoral campaigning, are older and more complex. They are rooted in the work of the great American pacifist A. J. Muste, a Protestant minister, who died early in 1967, six months after laying the groundwork of the Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam. Muste—to cite only a few of his activities—was the leader of the textile workers' strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 1919, an official of the Brookwood Labor College in the nineteen-twenties, and a founder in the nineteen-thirties of the Trotskyites' American Workers Party. In the nineteen-forties, Muste was a pioneer in the agitation for nuclear disarmament and for repeal of the draft laws. In the nineteen-fifties, he played a crucial role in various civil-rights organizations,

ON QUAKING BOG

When the walkers-on-water went under,
the bog-walkers came out of the barberry
thickets, booted in gum to their hips,
in a corona of midges, their ears electric
with sound, beating the stale of the swamp
with their whips and flailing the ground
for the itch under the frond, the fern's
demonology, the mosquito's decibel.

Night-sweat clotted their palms. They tasted
their gall. The sumac flickered a swatch
of its leaves in the lichens and venoms,
a dazzle was seen in the fog
as a vegetal world gave way to a uterine;
pitch pulled at their heels and blackened
their knuckles, the bog-laurel's fan
opened its uttermost decimal and showed them the Bog.

Paradisaal, beyond purpose or menace, dewed
like the flesh of an apple with the damp
of creation, the disk of the pond glowed
under the dragonfly's bosses, where a faulting
of glaciers had left it—vaults of bog-rosemary,
buckbean, and Labrador tea, a dapple
of leavening mosses soaking in ice-water, peat-wicks
feeding their gas to the cranberry braziers.

They entered the bonfire together. The moss
took their weight like a trampoline;
they walked on the sponge and bitumen without
leaving a footprint. In between,
in the vats of mat-roses where the waterline
closed like a skin, the ambiguous
world of imbalance—non-being, the prehuman
and tentative—was one with the ludicrous.

The quaking began—under their boot soles
at first, like a whale under ambergris,
then cramming their wrists with a drummer's
vibrations, knocking their ribs and their knees
as all sagged and rebounded. They lurched on the wet
as though tracing a profile of breakers,
or displacing the cords and the voids of a net,
and staggered back into their childhoods

till their feet touched the granite again.
The Bog tossed them over the threshold
that opened a path in the spruce toward the opposite
edges. The leaves closed behind them. They walked
an unyielding and tangible world like strangers, remembering
only the hovering glare where the pitcher-plant's
hammer closed on the fly—the light shaking and shaking—
as a pulse touched their feet from below, and passed over.

—BEN BELITT

particularly in the direction of CORE, and had a large influence in the formation of Martin Luther King's and Bayard Rustin's philosophies of non-violence. Throughout these decades, Muste was also an active leader in the Fellowship of Reconciliation, an international pacifist organization founded during the First World War. Although he went through a two-year Marxist period in the nineteen-thirties with the American Workers Party, he came to believe, in the last two decades of his life, that in a nuclear age it was the peace movement, not the working class or any political grouping, that would be the most important force in reforming society. But Muste argued that pacifism could only attract a sizable number of converts if a commit-

ted minority called dramatic attention to its principles. It was his contention that the peace movement could only affect the uncommitted by "mobilizing" people, by getting them out into the street to confront authority, and that only men "acting with their bodies" in non-violent demonstrations could create enough radical change in individuals' consciences to bring about a just and warless society. Muste's politics of the street, which blended the techniques of labor protest with the principles of non-violence advocated by Tolstoy and Gandhi, had already been widely and effectively used in the civil-rights movement when the United States became heavily involved in the Vietnam war in 1965, and hundreds of Americans turned to Muste for leadership. It was a motley group that sought him out, for throughout his career Muste had been stern in his assertion that peace groups must remain non-exclusive, that any man who wished to work for peace—be he a conservative Episcopal minister, a Communist, or a student activist—must be admitted into the peace movement as long as he was willing to abide by the rules of non-violence. "If what we believe is not strong enough to absorb all these people," Muste said, "then it is not entirely real."

The first Mobilization meeting, which Muste presided over in Cleveland in July, 1966, was attended by Quakers and Trotskyites, liberal academics and campus rebels, morally-outraged Methodist ministers, and glandular leftists rooting for the Vietcong. Cleveland had been chosen as a meeting place because some of the nation's first anti-Vietnam teach-ins had been held there, at Case Western Reserve University, in the spring of 1965, and also because two prominent members of the University's teach-in committee—Sidney Peck, of the Sociology Department, and Benjamin Spock, of the Medical School—were eager to have it meet there. The peace movement was badly split at that time over the problems of whether to include the far left in its activities and whether to demand immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. Indeed, these two issues di-




"Try to get some sleep, dear. I'm sure the pool isn't cracking."

vided and almost destroyed SANE in 1966. Under Muste's guidance, the first Mobilization convention dealt forthrightly with both problems, affirming his principle of non-exclusion and setting forth more strongly than ever the thesis that Vietnam was not an accident or a miscalculation but a symptom of a deep sickness in American foreign policy.

Muste died, at the age of eighty-two, in February of 1967, after returning from a trip to Hanoi. He had gone there with David Dellinger, leading a delegation of pacifists. And after Muste's death it was Dellinger who became the moving spirit of the Mobilization, and a chief tactician for the increasingly turbulent peace demonstrations of the next two years: the New York rally of April, 1967, the March on the Pentagon in the following fall, and the demonstrations at the Chicago Convention in the summer of 1968. The violence that occurred in Chicago alienated a great many Americans from peace demonstrations, and, largely because of this new national mood, Sidney Peck in-

ited a number of people who had been associated with the Mobilization to meet in Cleveland in July, 1969, to discuss which way the peace movement should go next. It was decided that all future protests were to be both legal and non-violent in nature, and great emphasis was placed on drawing new support from four groups in which anti-war sentiment had been growing: the labor movement, the armed forces, high-school students, and the religious community. The New Mobe of 1969 was an infinitely broader and less radical coalition than the first Mobe of 1966 had been. There was still a motley variety of Old and New Leftists on the New Mobe's national steering committee, notably half a dozen Trotskyites, who got on it by packing the convention with their followers. But it also incorporated a wide variety of middle-of-the-road religious, pacifist, political, and labor groups, including the National Council of Churches, the United Methodist Church, the New Democratic Coalition, and District 65 of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Workers' Union. The



*"Before you start knocking the Administration, don't forget
who cut the funds for medical research."*

only significant New Left groups not included were those which refused to pledge themselves to legal and non-violent tactics, such as the Yippies and the Weatherman faction of S.D.S. (which had announced that its slogan was not "End the War" anymore but "Bring the War Home"). One member of the New Mobe's steering committee, Irwin Bock, who posed as a representative of the Veterans for Peace group, later surfaced at the Chicago conspiracy trial as an undercover policeman, which prompted Sidney Lens to say, "We're a *really* broad coalition. We range from the Trots to the Chicago police."

The New Mobe met in Cleveland just four days after the Vietnam Moratorium Committee made the first public announcement of its existence. Right from the start, there was at least one link between the two groups in the person of David Hawk, a coordinator of the Moratorium, who attended the New Mobe convention, received its enthusiastic backing of the Moratorium, and was elected to the New Mobe's steering committee. But in the months that followed the relationship between the two organizations, whose headquarters were only a floor apart at 1029 Vermont Avenue, were often strained. The powerful and distinguished company of Americans who had expressed their support of the Moratorium by the end of September—including John Kenneth Galbraith, Richard Goodwin, Walter Reuther, Republican Party Chairman Representative Rogers Morton, and Democratic Party Chairman Senator Fred Harris, along with some forty other members of Congress—made it difficult for the Moratorium to be officially affiliated with a group that contained a sizable sprinkling of the Old and New Left and that denounced

the imperialist nature of American foreign policy in its entirety.

A typical example of the Moratorium backers' uneasiness about the New Mobe was a phone call made early in October by Adam Walinsky, a former Kennedy aide who was directing Moratorium activities in New York City, to Richard Fernandez, a member of the executive committee of the New Mobe. Walinsky suggested that if Arnold Johnson, the one Communist Party member on the New Mobe's steering committee, would "step down," the New Mobe would be "more acceptable" to the Moratorium. "Wisdom might indicate that to retain your following this might be necessary," Walinsky said. Fernandez reacted to this pressure against Johnson, a sixty-five-year-old graduate of the Union Theological Seminary who had been a close friend of Muste's, with a burst of quixotic humor. "My inclination," Fernandez said, "would be to add ten C.P.s to the steering committee, to provide a front for Arnold Johnson." According to Fernandez, Walinsky was not amused. Some leaders of the New Mobe have said they find it symptomatic that one member of the American Communist Party, a conservative and impotent organization of a few thousand members (a fifth of whom are estimated to be F.B.I. men), which preaches peaceful coexistence and whose radical potential is about that of the Salvation Army, still elicits panic from some of the highly educated men who have endorsed the Moratorium. The issue produced friction between the two groups. And many New Mobe people accused the Moratorium backers of encouraging Red-baiting by the right-wing press—which has often referred to the New Mobe as "Communist-led" and "Communist-inspired"—and of fur-

ther aggravating the Red-baiting tendencies of the Nixon Administration.

It could be argued that the Moratorium's original program of coordinating nationwide walkouts and shut-downs, augmented by a day a month until the war came to an end, was actually much more revolutionary than the New Mobe's plan to assemble half a million Americans in Washington for one peaceful afternoon. Like most under-thirty activists, the young men and women who devised the Moratorium's low-keyed style of selling peace tend to regard the warmed-up Marxist rhetoric of the Old Left not with fear but with a mixture of humor and disdain. The Moratorium leaders are convinced that strident demonstrations can only alienate the broad middle-class constituency from which they hope to win a symbolic vote for peace. Although the young Moratorium leaders come from vastly different backgrounds, they are all advocates of what they call the "politics of low visibility," which is the direct opposite of the high-visibility politics that A. J. Muste had hoped would change the consciences of men. Sam Brown, whose father runs a chain of shoe stores in the Midwest, who speaks constantly of the need to maintain close liaison with "the Hill," and who is said to have congressional ambitions himself, is extremely sensitive to what people will think back in his home town of Council Bluffs, Iowa. "The very people whom the movement is trying to bring in have become wary of demonstrations," he says. "We have to go back to a slow, tough building operation." David Mixner, the son of a warehouse worker, started organizing migratory farm workers at the age of fifteen, and specializes in getting labor backing for the Moratorium. "We are trying to create a non-partisan base in every congressional district," he says. "We're going to a broader coalition with new and different entry levels. For my father, who is a member of the Teamsters' Union, wearing a black armband to work on October 15th was a major event. He debated it for days. He's not ready to march in Washington." David Hawk, son of a Pennsylvania electronics salesman, was an all-American diver at Cornell and describes himself as having been brought up in a "Nixon-Billy Graham sort of home." The fourth coordinator of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, Marge Sklencar, daughter of a Chicago research chemist, spent a year in a convent of Franciscan nuns before going to Mundelein College, in Chicago, where she was president both

of the student body and of the S.D.S. chapter. Like the others, she is convinced that the Moratorium's grass-roots tactics are "more difficult, radical, and effective" than any demonstration.

The atmosphere of the Moratorium offices is characterized by collegiate cheerfulness and miniskirted volunteers wearing shiny buttons that say "Mc-Government" and "You're a Good Man, Charlie Goodell." Larry Kudlow, one of the Moratorium's fifteen regional organizers, is typical of the young Moratorium activists searching for a new style in politics. Kudlow, who is twenty-five, worked for McCarthy in the early months of his campaign, became disillusioned, switched to the Kennedy campaign, and, after the assassination, "freaked out" and joined the S.D.S., because it seemed to be "the only ballgame in town." He dropped out of S.D.S. when the most violent splinter group in that organization—the Revolutionary Youth Movement I, or RYM I, now known as the Weatherman faction—took over the national S.D.S. office. Kudlow spent the summer of 1969 doing odd chores in Representative Allard Lowenstein's office, but became disillusioned there, too, and joined the Moratorium staff after a brief stint at the office of Senator Goodell. Despite the many disappointments he has suffered, Kudlow's criticism of the New Mobe is based on a kind of buoyant optimism that seems to be shared by many young activists who found state-primary politics surprisingly easy and enjoyable. "Demonstrations were a minority tactic that were good for '66 and '67," Kudlow said recently. "We have a majority now, and have to do grass-roots organizing on that assumption. The days of symbolism are over." He is also wary of the broad coalition composing the New Mobe. "It includes too much of the Old Left to attract the middle ground," he explained. "I'm a history major, and I know how hopelessly conservative the American C.P. and Trotskyites are, but the American people and lots of congressmen are not ready to hear it. Our only hope is with a centrist movement, rather than with the New Mobe's popular front." As an example of how cautiously the Moratorium handles its constituents, Kudlow cited a controversial group in a conservative area of the country which, although it is most enthusiastic

about the Moratorium, has organized under the name Committee for the Celebration of Peace and Life, because the Moratorium is considered too controversial for that area. "In a few months, they'll surface as Moratorium," Kudlow said, with parental pride, "and then I'll send them pins and bumper stickers."

The atmosphere of the New Mobe headquarters, one floor above the Moratorium offices, had the helter-skelter austerity of an emergency-relief station. In this setting, Stewart Meacham, managing to look like an affable bank president, explained why he had taken to the politics of the street at the age of fifty-nine. "We at Mobe are more disillusioned with electoral politics than the Moratorium kids," he said. "We believe that we're in a deep Constitutional crisis, and we're wondering whether our system of government is elastic enough to allow the voice of the people to be effective. I campaigned for Eugene McCarthy and ended up voting for Dick Gregory. To carve out a distinction between Nixon and Humphrey was meaningless. Our Constitutional system not only failed us last year in Chicago—it also failed us when our courts refused to hear evidence on issues raised by young resisters claiming Nuremberg principles to not go to war and commit crimes against humanity in Vietnam. How do you deal with structures that violate the legal authority of our society? Street politics is the last Constitutional means we have left—our assertion of the rights of free speech

and assembly. I have been lecturing to businessmen's clubs all over the country recently, saying, 'The most conservative thing you can do is to engage in the politics of the street—it is the only way to conserve our Constitutional system.'" Meacham, who became a pacifist and a Quaker in 1950, holds firmly to the Muste principle of non-exclusion. "Non-exclusionism is not only morally right from the pacifist point of view, it also has pragmatic validity. I believe that the most dynamic periods of our country's history were the periods when all sections of the political spectrum were working together—the years when the C.I.O. was founded, the first two decades of our century when the greatest humanitarian advances were gained by the workers, the years when Eugene Debs got six per cent of the Presidential vote and there were seventy-nine Socialist mayors in our country, the early years of the New Deal when a very wide variety of political ideologies were represented in Roosevelt's Cabinet. Once you start excluding, you have to start setting standards for purity, and you end up in an emasculated left or centrist segment." Meacham gave a sly smile and added, "The only trouble I have with the Trotskyites and the Communist member of our coalition is that they advocate more strongly than any other groups that demonstrations be kept not only non-violent but legal. That gives me trouble because we Quakers do not link non-violence with legality. On the contrary, we believe



that we often have to make our moral points by going to jail. Non-violence needs civil disobedience, and any Communist or Trots sees red at the mention of civil disobedience. They don't want to alienate the middle and lower classes. In terms of public image, it's often easier to accommodate to the Trots than to the Quakers."

IN the first weeks of October, while the Moratorium was still hedging on its endorsement of the New Mobe, some New Mobe leaders were practicing their own brand of exclusionism toward the Moratorium. For several of the New Mobe leaders exhibited a holier-than-thou attitude about having come out against the war in 1965, which was as divisive as the Moratorium's prudent centrism. The congressmen and academics who turned out in large numbers to back the Moratorium in the second week of October were referred to by some New Mobe leaders as "Johnny-come-latelies hitching on to the peace bandwagon" and "Kennedy liberals responsible for the Vietnam war." "Forty-five thousand dead later they come out against the war," some New Mobe people muttered. And many of them were worried that the Moratorium's pending endorsement of the November demonstrations would sully the radical purity of their own program. "I'd feel bad if Walter Reuther spoke at our November rally, even if he asked for immediate withdrawal," Dellinger said at one of the New Mobe's executive-committee meetings. "Some people come in so soiled and opportunistic they have no right to be with us. If we fly with Reuther, it's like supporting Humphrey—we'll convince students that we are bourgeois and coöpted, and they will increasingly go toward the Weathermen."

"The New Mobe thinks that the congressmen and other leaders who have recently come out against the war are traitors because they have not opposed it since 1965," Sam Brown remarked that same week, "whereas we at Moratorium are looking for just that kind of congressmen." Throughout the country, there were Moratorium organizers who feared that the New Mobe's uncompromising rhetoric and the possibility of violence at the November rally would undo all the Moratorium's cautious grass-roots work. "We are trying to reach out to little people in the little towns of Iowa," one New England Moratorium organizer said. "We believe in soft, persuasive rhetoric for the heartland of

America. Moratorium kids don't want to be responsible for November. They're scared. Every peace freak in America is going to be there. Dellinger, and even Coretta King, are going to put people off. I know the New Mobe people are pure, but purity can mean bringing the whole thing down on your head."

A New Mobe organizer holding the opposite point of view replied, "If the Moratorium can't adjust itself to people who were against the war in 1965, and has to adjust itself to those late-comers who are making political hay out of the peace issue in 1969, then the Moratorium is not morally supportable."

IT has been said that the New Mobe leaders have the arrogance of prophets and the Moratorium leaders have the cautiousness of politicians. It took a housewife and a clergyman—both members of the New Mobe—to fuse the two organizations into a united front. The first was Cora Weiss, a thirty-six-year-old mother of three, a woman of remarkable energy and uncompromising candor. The second was Richard Fernandez, thirty-five and also the parent of three, a short, powerful man who attributes his own remarkable energy to a passion for basketball. (Wherever he travels, Fernandez packs an uninflated basketball in his suitcase and plays on the nearest court he can find.) Mrs. Weiss, whose visceral views on peace transcend all political ideology, was less adamant than most of her colleagues in the New Mobe about preserving radical purity, and was more sympathetic toward the Moratorium's problems. As for Fernandez, he insists, as did A. J. Muste, that "a radical change in society will not come from the political system but from a change in the moral consciousness of men." And, like Muste, Fernandez has the ability to push a program through against embattled opposition while retaining the affection of all his opponents. For five weeks before the Moratorium endorsed the New Mobe, Cora Weiss and Richard Fernandez worked unceasingly at healing divisions between the two groups, by stressing to other New Mobe leaders the absolute folly of not coöperating with the Moratorium, and by con-

vincing the Moratorium that the November rally would be legal, respectable, and non-violent. "We've got to discuss this a bit more among ourselves," Sam Brown, the most political and cautious of the four Moratorium leaders, would say when Mrs. Weiss phoned with her daily plea for endorsement. "Hurry up, cookie," she would answer. "The nation is ahead of you." ("They're just the victims of liberal Red-baiting," she would explain. "Congressmen should know that it's not chic to Red-bait anymore.") Actually, Brown and his colleagues had been planning all along to make an alliance with the New Mobe, but they wanted to make sure it was done without antagonizing their supporters. The success of the October Moratorium may have made the endorsement easier.

The two camps finally came together on the evening of October 20th—the night before the press conferences—and the meeting went much more smoothly than either side expected. The Moratorium agreed easily to the New Mobe's two basic principles: there was to be a demand for immediate withdrawal, and the peace coalition was to be kept non-exclusive. The New Mobe invited the four Moratorium coördinators to be on its executive committee, and offered them ten seats on its national steering committee. The Moratorium asked that two senators, one from each party, be invited to speak at the November 15th rally in order to make it a bipartisan program. There was some tension when the Reverend Joseph Duffey, chairman of the A.D.A. and one of the Moratorium's "adult advisers," objected to the rhetoric of the anti-imperialist position paper put forward by the New Mobe. "We can't support *this* awful stuff," Duffey said. "It's just a lot of radical noise. Who wrote it?" "I wrote it," Sidney Lens roared, "and I think *your* stuff is awful. We show it to our kids and they vomit." But the alliance had been formed by the time the meeting broke up at 1 A.M.

The agreement still had to be ratified by the New Mobe's national steering committee, and its next meeting—the first to include the Moratorium—was held in Chicago on November 2nd, two weeks before the rally. This meeting can only be described as a valiant exercise in participatory anarchy. What else could be expected from a caucus attended by representatives of the Unitarian Universalist Association, the Liberation News Service, the RYM \square faction of S.D.S., District 65 of the





"Holy cow! That guy owns everything out here!"

Department Store Workers' Union, and sixty other groups, each claiming a constituency of thousands and wanting to speak his piece? The mayhem was aggravated by the sectarian quibbling of the Old Left and the totalitarian self-righteousness of the New Left campus radicals. Little progress would have been made without Fernandez, who, as chairman, handled the tempestuous crowd with the authority and skill of a lion tamer. ("Sit down and shut up, RYM II. We're going to listen to the sister from the Ohio Peace Council.") The first order of business was to win approval of the new alliance with the Moratorium from the clamoring group, half of whom were muttering about being "coöpted by the liberals." Sidney Lens, who was chosen for the task because of the respect he commanded with wide sections of the left, said, "We woke up on October 16th lyrically elated, with a historically new situation. No anti-war action in history has had the impact that Moratorium has had." But his motion to seat the four Moratorium coördinators on the New Mobe's executive committee was followed by pandemonium. Phil Hutchins, a former leader of the Student National Coordinating Committee, accused the New Mobe chairmen of having made a deal with right-wing liberals. The editor of the radical weekly *Guardian* spoke angrily of "bourgeois

coöptation." "You're ending up with the left wing of the Democratic party!" a campus activist shouted. At that point, the women's-liberation groups and several of the New Mobe's co-chairmen threatened to resign if the Moratorium was not immediately seated. Dellinger offered a motion that four "more radical" members of the coalition be picked for the executive committee to "balance out" the Moratorium four. The Moratorium, which was represented at the meeting by Marge Sklencar and David Hawk—Brown and Mixner having shied away—threatened to walk out if Dellinger's motion was passed. "We're playing games trying to be ideologically pure while people are dying!" shouted Terrence Hallinan, a young San Francisco lawyer who was co-chairman of the New Mobe for the West Coast. "Our task is not to go to meetings we dig but to get peace, and for that we've got to unite with the Moratorium!" There were cries of "Right on!" from some members of the caucus, boos and hisses from others. "The last thing we want is a walkout by the Moratorium," warned the Trotskyite leader Fred Halstead, who had been a chief marshal for many of the peaceful protest marches of past years and was again chief marshal of the November 15th rally. "The real problem we want to concentrate on is how to avoid any

civil disobedience, any politics of confrontation." Finally, after three hours of debate, the alliance with the Moratorium was approved by a small margin.

The next order of business was to persuade the national committee to accept the speakers' list that had been drawn up for the November 15th rally. The most prominent names on it were Senator McGovern, Senator Goodell, Coretta King, George Wald, David Dellinger, Teamsters' International Vice-President Harold Gibbons, and former Under-Secretary of Commerce Howard Samuels.

"You've become the imperialist, élitist Mobe!" a RYM II girl shouted from the back of the hall after Cora Weiss had finished reading the list. "Those congressmen and businessmen are war criminals!"

"Right on, sister!" some campus radicals yelled.

"I want none of that!" Cora Weiss bellowed in the voice of an angry schoolmarm. "Keep quiet or get out of here!"

"Those who want a RYM II show are the worst exclusionists of all!" Lens cried out. "If I'm not going to be coöpted by McGovern, I'm not going to be coöpted by the S.D.S., either!"

But there were still dozens of complaints to be heard—protests that there were no Puerto Rican or Asian-Amer-

ican speakers on the list, demands that "multi-issues of imperialism" be proclaimed from the platform by Trotskyite anti-war G.I.s, accusations that the platform was "male chauvinistic" because only four out of the twelve speakers were women. Before the vote was taken, a last, passionate plea that the list of speakers be accepted without modifications was made by a benign, grandfatherly man with pink cheeks and a tuft of silvery hair, who was generally considered the most conservative member of the New Mobe coalition. "You guys get moving instead of bickering!" he pleaded. "How can November 15th surpass October 15th? What a tremendous task! Senator Goodell had a hundred thousand in Boston! Our job is to create a massive political movement and force our government out of war!" This was Arnold Johnson, the gentleman from the Communist Party.

Toward the end of the meeting, which lasted ten hours, Abbie Hoffman, the Yippie leader, came to the front of the room to speak. A man with a disproportionately long torso, short bowed legs, and a wild head of coarse black hair tied at the nape, which looked

like a periwig worn askew, Hoffman had jotted down some notes with a ballpoint pen, in minuscule script, on the very small, pudgy palm of his left hand. Referring to these notes, he asked the New Mobe to endorse an action he was planning in support of the Chicago conspiracy-trial defendants at "the Department of Injustice" on the evening of the November 15th rally.

There was a groan of displeasure from all over the hall, and Arnold Johnson said over and over, "Oh, no, no, no, no."

Hoffman leered and said, "Well, it's going to happen whether Mobe and Agnew endorse it or not."

Harry Ring, the aging gray eminence of the Socialist Workers' Party, rose to say, "This is just what we don't want. The government is looking for every reason it can find to propagandize this as a violent demonstration. It is the most effective weapon the ruling class has."

A motion to the effect that there would be no announcement from the platform at the November 15th rally of any event not endorsed by the New Mobe was carried by a bizarre alli-

ance for law and order that included the Socialists, the Trotskyites, Arnold Johnson, various middle-of-the-road groups such as SANE and the National Council of Churches, and the new right wing of the New Mobe—the clean-for-Gene Moratorium kids who shared with the Old Left a horror of confrontation politics. Abbie Hoffman was to stage his demonstration at the Justice Department without the New Mobe's official endorsement, thus providing just about the only evidence Attorney General Mitchell was able to cite when he claimed that the November 15th rally could not be "characterized as peaceful."

DURING the days that preceded the Washington demonstrations, the Justice Department refused to approve a permit for a march down Pennsylvania Avenue, predicting violence on November 15th, and made vigorous attempts to divide the alliance that had been worked out between the Moratorium and the New Mobe. The New Mobe alone was in charge of negotiating for the march permit. Yet right in the middle of the negotiations John W. Dean III, a Justice Department official who was referred to by demonstration leaders as "a very pleasant Humphrey-Lindsay type of liberal" but was obviously following orders from less friendly superiors, invited Sam Brown and David Hawk to the Department to discuss the route of the march. The New Mobe's negotiating team—composed of Richard Fernandez, Stewart Meacham, and Ron Young—had an appointment at the Justice Department just afterward and arrived a little early. When Dean heard that the New Mobe delegation was outside, he asked the Moratorium leaders if they wouldn't prefer to go out his side door, so that they wouldn't be seen. But the Moratorium people chose to go out by the front door, pausing to shake hands with the New Mobe leaders, and later that afternoon Brown and Fernandez agreed that the Moratorium leaders should not accept any further invitations to the Justice Department. Four days later, Brown and Hawk were again invited to go there and discuss the permit issue, this time with Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst. They declined.

The Monday morning before the November 15th rally, the New Mobe's negotiating team had its only face-to-face meeting with Kleindienst. The march permit still had not been granted and time was running out for both sides; according to Fernandez, Klein-



"You know, you're the only person I know who laughs with the corners of his mouth down."

dienst's language was rough as he made his last attempt to have the New Mobe accept Constitution Avenue instead of Pennsylvania. "I don't want to have to shoot any demonstrators on the White House lawn," Kleindienst told Fernandez. "I'll have to line both sides of Pennsylvania Avenue with American soldiers shoulder to shoulder." But that afternoon the District's Mayor, Walter Washington, intervened directly with President Nixon, and the following day a march permit for Pennsylvania Avenue was granted. Fernandez' explanation of the Justice Department's tactics is that "Kleindienst tried to gain a personal victory by scaring us before being overruled by his bosses. But we're not the kind who scare quickly."

Preparations went smoothly after that, although one potentially divisive issue had to be resolved at the last minute. Late in October, Senator McCarthy had been invited to speak at the New Mobe's California rally and declined. However, he had let it be known, partly through remarks he made to people in the peace movement, that he was intending to speak at the Washington rally. Since Senators Goodell and McGovern had been approved as speakers by the New Mobe's national steering committee only after turbulent debate, adding a third senator to the afternoon program was clearly out of the question. But it was evident that a special spot had to be devised for McCarthy in some other part of the program. The final decision was to schedule him for nine-thirty in the morning, at the very beginning of the march. He would be getting, as some New Mobe leaders put it acidly, "prime visibility time." Richard Fernandez and Stewart Meacham went to see McCarthy on Thursday to offer him the nine-thirty spot, and after reading them some of his new poetry McCarthy readily agreed to speak at nine-thirty on the Mall below the Capitol, where the march was to begin.

A crowd of some twenty-five thousand had gathered when McCarthy arrived, hatless and with his coat open in the sun-drenched but freezing morning. The demonstrators' placards, bobbing against the sky like sails on a blue bay, were exceedingly cheerful. "Free Kim Agnew," "Young Hegelian Society for Peace," "Snobs for Peace," "Jesus Christ Did Not Carry a Draft Card," "Support Your Local Planet." In the pleasant, flat voice that always sounds as if he were about to come down with a cold, McCarthy spoke of "the cases in which political leaders,

out of misjudgment or ambition, in ancient times and in modern times, basing their action on the loyalty of their people, have done great harm to their own countries and to the world." At the end, he quoted some Gide. "Last year, it was Péguy," a girl in the crowd said. "Next year, St. John Perse." After the applause, the crowd began to chant "Peace now! Peace now!"—at first slowly, but accelerating in tempo and volume like a football cheer. McCarthy gave his cold, wide smile, and the largest peace march in the history of the nation began.

Later that afternoon, the colorful carpet of humanity that stretched up the gentle greensward of the Mall would grow to at least half a million. Some of the New Mobe leaders said they regretted that Muste had not lived to see all this humanity asking for peace together; it was the apotheosis of everything he had preached for sixty years. And many of the demonstrators regretted the passing of an era—a decade of marching had come to an end. Given the way the nation's present leaders were polarizing Americans' emotions, some found it doubtful whether such huge and visible expressions of conscience could remain peaceful in the future.

THE Moratorium activities across the nation in December were extremely quiet compared to the October turnouts. As it enters the sixth month of its existence, the Moratorium is carefully evaluating its original tactics. For the time being, the original plan calling for nationwide shutdowns to be expanded by one day each month has been abandoned. In January, February, and March, one "peace day" a month is to be dedicated to grass-roots educational campaigns, stressing the impact of the war on taxes and inflation, and the dangers of a possible recession. "If we can demonstrate to Americans that nineteen cents out of their every tax dollar goes into the Vietnam war and fifty-four cents of it into military expenditure, we can have a real taxpayers' revolt," David Hawk has predicted. A good deal of effort will also be concentrated on getting peace candidates elected in the 1970 congressional elections.

The Moratorium coordinators have various explanations as to why they have been unable to carry out their original, more radical program. "We peaked too early," Sam Brown says. "October was too big for our own good, because the nation had not had

a chance to demonstrate its anti-war sentiment for a whole year. It would have been healthier and simpler for us to start slowly and grow month by month." Marge Sklencar believes that the Moratorium overestimated the country's activist potential. "We were using our own five-year committedness as a standard for the nation, and too many people are still indifferent," she says. "The obstacle to getting peace is not the silent majority but the indifferent majority." David Hawk stresses the placating effects of Nixon's November 3rd speech. "Nixon's speech was a moral disaster, but it was very brilliant, and it will make us lie low for a few months," Hawk says. "However, in the long run it will help us, because the peace movement had not taken Nixon's politics serious until November 3rd. Now we know that his true intention is to continue a pro-West client state in Vietnam, and we can fight back more accurately." The Moratorium leaders estimate that it will take the nation three or four months to realize that Nixon's November 3rd speech was "a public-relations coverup for a continued war." On the basis of this prediction, the Moratorium plans to hold its next round of substantial, high-visibility activities on April 15th, with demonstrations at Internal Revenue Service centers in dozens of cities throughout the nation. In April, it will also support three-day fasts on university campuses, and thousands of non-students are expected to join. "The self-denial involved in fasting will stress the immorality of the war," David Hawk says. "And the immorality of this war is one thing that cannot be co-opted."

The New Mobe has also selected April as the time for new demonstrations across the country. Whatever their ideological differences may be, the Moratorium and the New Mobe agree that the peace movement in 1970 will tend strongly toward local actions rather than huge rallies in Washington, Los Angeles, or New York. "The new phenomenon of the movement is decentralized demonstration," says Ron Young, of the New Mobe, "and that's an evidence of the enormous growth of anti-war sentiment. A year or two ago, you could never have pulled anything off outside of the major cities." And Sam Brown adds, "Thirty people meeting in a church basement in Peoria to protest the war for the first time may be infinitely more important than thirty thousand people converging on Washington."

—FRANCINE DU PLESSIX GRAY